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BEYOND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL:
EVALUATING THE OPTIONS
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
The Independent Counsel Act' expires on June 30, 1999.2 Should it be
extended? Extended with modifications? Radically reformed? Or should it
be allowed to sunset with nothing put in its place? To answer these questions,
we need to address some more fundamental questions: (1) Do we truly need an
independent office to investigate alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking officers
of the executive branch? (2) If so, what are the options for the organizational
structure of such an office? (3) By what criteria should the different institu-
tional options be evaluated? (4) Under these criteria, which option represents
the best, or perhaps more realistically, the least-worst choice?
The great danger is that the fate of the independent counsel law will be
determined not by grappling with these fundamental questions, but out of a re-
action, or more accurately over-reaction, to recent controversies involving the
independent counsel. The history of the Independent Counsel Act, which has
been revised at roughly five-year intervals since it was first adopted in 1978,3
has consistently been one of tacking back and forth in response to the most re-
cent episodes involving investigation of executive branch officials.4
The original Act of 1978, of course, was passed in response to Watergate,
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. I would like to thank Akhil
Amar, Steve Calabresi, Michael Dreeben, and Michael Rappaport for their assistance.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§591-599 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994 & Supp. 1996). The Act continues in effect after June 30
"with respect to then pending matters before an independent counsel that in the judgment of such
counsel require such continuation until that independent counsel determines such matters have
been completed." Id. Thus, the investigation of independent counsel Kenneth Starr into White-
water and related matters may well continue after the expiration date.
3. The Independent Counsel Act lapsed in 1992 in the face of opposition from the Bush
Administration and Senate Republicans. The in-coming Clinton administration, however,
strongly supported the idea of a statutory independent counsel, and Congress obliged in 1994 by
renewing the Act for an additional five years.
4. See Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past
Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489 (1998). For earlier historical accounts, see
KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1992); TERRY EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS, AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL:
EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-1989 (1989).
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and especially the famous "Saturday night massacre" that resulted in the firing
of special prosecutor Archibald Cox. The basic features of the Act-
appointment of the independent counsel by. a special Article III judicial panel
and the restriction on any removal of the counsel by the Attorney General ex-
cept for "good cause"-were designed to assure that. never again would an in-
dependent prosecutor be subject to executive branch interference analogous to
President Nixon's firing of Cox.
When the Act was amended and renewed in 1983, the most recent epi-
sodes seemed trivial by comparison to Watergate: Hamilton Jordan, a White
House aide to President Carter, and Tim Craft, a. Carter campaign official, had
been targeted for investigation by independent counsels for alleged illegal drug
use. Accordingly, the theme of the 1983 amendments was modest retrench-
ment in the Act in order to avoid the "unfairness" of subjecting executive offi-
cials to investigations over relatively minor offenses. 5
By the time the 1987 amendments rolled around, the pendulum had swung
again in the opposite direction. Now the burning issue of the day was the Iran-
Contra scandal. Accordingly, the theme of the 1987 amendments was the need
to expand the authority of the independent counsels and to further restrict the
power of the Attorney General. Thus, independent counsels were given new
authority to investigate crimes arising, out of the behavior of the target during
an investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evi-
dence, and intimidation of witnesses. 6 In addition,. independent counsels were
given the authority to recommend that the Attorney General request an expan-
sion of their original jurisdiction to include newly discovered unrelated mat-
ters, and required the Attorney General to give "great weight" to such recom-
mendations. 7
Today, independent counsel Kenneth Starr's exercise of the powers con-
ferred in the 1987 amendments to investigate abuses committed by a popular
President has, predictably, given rise to a chorus of complaints about over-
reaching by independent counsels. It does not take a great visionary to foretell
that the debates. over the renewal of the statute in 1999 will be dominated by
the perceived excesses of the Starr investigation into Whitewater and the
Monica Lewinsky scandals.8 Thus, we will hear repeatedly about the need to
confine the independent counsel to investigating alleged crimes committed
during an official's tenure in federal office (read: no more Whitewater investi-
5., See Harriger, supra note 4, at 508.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)(3) (1994)..
7. Id. § 593(c)(2).
8. For proposed reforms inspired by the Starr investigation and additional citations to the
literature, see Julian A. Cook, III, Mend It Or End It? What To Do With The Independent Coun-
sel Statute, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 279 (1998); Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the
Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MicH. L. REV. 601 (1998).
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gations); about the need to narrowly define the independent counsel's jurisdic-
tion and place limits on the expansion of that jurisdiction (read: no more
Monica Lewinsky investigations); about the need to require that independent
counsels devote themselves to the office full time (read: no more Ken Starrs
who continue to practice law. while serving as independent counsel); and about
the need to place limits on the funding for independent counsels (read: no
more $40 million investigations of popular Presidents). All this is completely
myopic, and simply adds another cycle of legislative reaction to what has gone
before.
It is perhaps only natural that legislators, like generals, should always be
preparing to fight the last war. But it is a tendency that should be strongly re-
sisted, especially in considering a matter that goes to the heart of our constitu-
tional structure of government. It will be no great tragedy if the Starr investi-
gation leads to a repeal of the Independent Counsel Act and a return to affairs
as they existed before Watergate. That, in the larger scheme of things, would
be a relatively benign (and probably temporary) outcome. The greater loss
would be if the near-universal disillusionment with the Act that now prevails
does not become the occasion for a fundamental reconsideration of the dilem-
mas inherent in investigations of high ranking executive officials, and a sus-
tained effort to discover a sounder, more stable balance of competing consid-
erations. It is to that end that these remarks are dedicated.
The paper is organized as follows. Part I considers whether we need an
independent investor for alleged executive branch wrongdoing, and concludes
that such an investigator is necessary in two circumstances-when allegations
of misconduct are directed at the President or the Attorney General-and may
be desirable in other circumstances where the Justice Department's impartial-
ity may reasonably be questioned, depending on the costs of the institution
created to undertake such investigations. Part II summarizes five institutional
options for conducting such independent investigations. Part III sets forth
three structural variables that should be used in assessing these institutional
options: independence versus accountability; 'transience versus permanence;
and compatibility with traditional constitutional understandings. Part IV then
reviews the institutional options against these structural variables. I conclude
that the independent counsel is almost -certainly the worst of the options. The
best (or least worst) option is more debatable, but I argue that independent in-
vestigations should be given over to an office of career prosecutors within the
Justice Department headed by an officer who has been nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, but who enjoys greater independence
from the President and the Attorney General than ordinary political appointees.
I. DO WE NEED AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR?
The first fundamental question to ask is: Do we need an office that is inde-
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pendent of the President and the Attorney General to investigate allegations of
executive branch wrongdoing? For most of our Nation's history, the answer to
this question was "no." After twenty years of independent counsel investiga-
tions (which number now some twenty in total), the answer is more likely to
seem a self-evident "yes." To truly grapple with this question, we need to
identify the purposes of having such an independent investigator. Three dif-
ferent rationales for having an independent office to investigate high-level ex-
ecutive officials have been advanced in the post-Watergate era: to gather the
information necessary to consider impeachment of a President; to undertake a
good faith investigation of high-level executive officials in circumstances
where the Justice Department has a conflict of interest; and to preserve public
confidence in investigations of executive officials where the Justice Depart-
ment suffers from the appearance of a conflict of interest. I will consider each
in turn.
A. Presidential Impeachment
The first reason for having an independent investigator is to lay the
groundwork for possible impeachment of the President. This rationale has
been at least implicit in the three most important episodes involving investiga-
tions of the executive in the last twenty-five years: the investigations by inde-
pendent prosecutors Cox and Leon Jaworksi into the Watergate scandal, which
led to President Richard Nixon's resignation to avoid almost certain impeach-
ment by the House; the investigation by Lawrence Walsh into the Iran-Contra
scandal, which Walsh thought might have led to President Ronald Reagan's
impeachment if all the facts had come out sooner;9 and the investigation by
Ken Starr into Clinton's alleged perjury and obstruction of justice in the Mon-
ica Lewinsky affair, which produced an impeachment by the House but ac-
quittal by the Senate. Three impeachments or near-impeachments of Presi-
dents in the last twenty-five years suggest that presidential impeachment is an
issue of considerable importance and, in recent years at least, of some regular-
ity.
From a structural constitutional perspective, there is a compelling need for
an independent investigator to serve as an adjunct to the impeachment process.
Impeachment is the constitutionally prescribed method for removing high-
ranking executive and judicial officials from office before the natural end of
their term. Although Congress has used this power only once to impeach an
9. See LAURENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVER-
UP 494, 499 (1997) (recounting Walsh's statements to the press after the pardon of former De-
fense Secretary Casper Weinberger to the effect that Weinberger deserved criminal prosecution
because his concealment of contemporaneous notes had "possibly forestalled timely impeach-
ment proceedings against President Reagan").
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executive official other than the President,10 it has impeached two Presidents
and has impeached and convicted a number of federal judges, including three
since 1986.11
If Congress is to properly perform its constitutionally delegated impeach-
ment function, it needs an agent to uncover the facts surrounding alleged im-
peachable offenses. It is unrealistic to expect the members of the House, or
even the members of the Judiciary Committee, to do all the investigatory work
themselves. 12 This is especially true of the preliminary investigatory field-
work, such as gathering documents and interviewing witnesses. And it is ob-
viously unrealistic to expect the Attorney General-a member of the Presi-
dent's cabinet who serves at the will of the President-to oversee an
investigation by Justice Department personnel that may lead to the impeach-
ment of the President. This suggests the need for a staff of investigators who
are not members of Congress but also are independent of the President or the
Attorney General.
In the Clinton impeachment, the investigatory fieldwork was done for the
House by independent counsel Starr. This was pursuant to a provision of the
Independent Counsel Act that directs an independent counsel to advise the
House of any "substantial and credible information" which "may constitute
grounds for impeachment."' 3 Starr construed this provision to authorize his
referral to the House not only of a massive amount of evidence he had gath-
ered using the grand jury and other traditional tools of prosecutorial investiga-
tion, but also a report summarizing the evidence that had the tone of a brief in
support of Clinton's impeachment.
Of course, it is not necessary that the investigator who gathers evidence for
impeachment proceedings be an independent counsel, nor is it necessary that
the independent investigator make any evaluation or recommendations re-
garding evidence that has been gathered. The investigative function could be
given to a "legislative" officer. For example, the staff of the House Judiciary
Committee could be authorized to conduct investigations of high-level execu-
tive officers, or the General Accounting Office could be asked to perform this
function. Alternatively, as I will argue below, the investigation could be un-
10. Secretary of War William W. Belknap was impeached by the House in 1876 just hours
after he submitted his resignation. He was subsequently acquitted by the Senate. See MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 185 n.3 (1996).
11. The three judges convicted and removed from office were Harry Claiborne, a district
judge in Nevada in 1986; Alcee Hastings, a district judge in Florida in 1989; and Walter Nixon, a
district judge in Mississippi in 1989. Id.
12. As Michael Gerhardt explains, there are few political rewards to Members of the House
for expending time and effort on impeachment matters, especially those involving low visibility
officers like federal district judges. Id. at 27-28.
13. 28 U.S.C. §595(c) (1994).
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dertaken by a unit of the Justice Department staffed by members of the perma-
nent civil service. Yet regardless how the office is organized, the agent that
gathers the information necessary to determine whether to impeach the Presi-
dent must almost certainly be someone who is not immediately accountable to
the President or the Attorney General.
I am not suggesting that there is a need for a permanent institution devoted
to the investigation of possible impeachable offenses. Although presidential
impeachment has loomed large the last twenty-five years, we should all hope
this is an aberration. Presidential impeachment is highly distracting and time-
consuming, and if over-used would undermine basic principles of democratic
government and separation of powers. It should be reserved for only extraor-
dinary circumstances. This strongly counsels against creating a permanent of-
fice of independent investigations solely to facilitate impeachment inquiries,
since such an office should ordinarily have nothing to do, and if it felt a need
to justify its existence, it would become a disruptive influence. 14
In any event, we have one clear case where an independent investigator is
at least episodically required: where the House is contemplating impeachment
of the President. Are there any others?
B. Conflict of Interest
The second conception of the purpose of an independent investigator fre-
quently advanced in the post-Watergate period is that it permits criminal
prosecution of high-level executive officials in circumstances where the Attor-
ney General and other high-ranking officers of the Justice Department have a
"conflict of interest."1 5 Conflict of interest is a concept that is susceptible to a
variety of meanings. I will distinguish here between traditional understandings
of conflict of interest and what the Ethics in Government Act calls "political
conflict of interest," and will argue that only the former provides a meaningful
basis for identifying circumstances when an independent investigator is indis-
pensable. As discussed below, the idea of a political conflict of interest seeks
to address a problem better considered under the rubric of an appearance of
partiality.
1. Traditional Conflict of Interest
As conventionally used in discussing when judges and prosecutors should
recuse themselves from particular proceedings, the concept of conflict of inter-
14. See EASTLAND, supra note 4, at 132 (making a similar point about a permanent inde-
pendent counsel's office).
15. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (stating matter-of-factly that
"Congress of course was concerned when it created the office of independent counsel with the
conflicts of interest that could arise in situations when the Executive Branch is called upon to in-
vestigate its own high-ranking officers").
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est has a reasonably well established core of meaning.' 6 Most commonly,
government officials are said to have a conflict of interest with respect to a
particular matter when they have a financial interest in the outcome, or when a
member of their immediate family is involved.
17
This traditional understanding of conflict of interest suggests a narrow but
important class of cases beyond presidential impeachment where an independ-
ent investigator is required: where an executive branch officer is asked to in-
vestigate potential criminal conduct by a superior officer. Such a request cre-
ates a conflict of interest analogous to having a financial stake in the matter
under investigation, because such an investigating officer may reasonably fear
that the superior will retaliate if criminal charges are brought against them.
This conflict would be particularly acute in the case of a subordinate officer
who is an employee at will not protected by the civil service laws. For exam-
ple, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, who is
a political appointee dischargeable at will, should be regarded as having a con-
flict of interest in investigating the Attorney General, who has the power to
dismiss such an Assistant Attorney General and, short of dismissal, otherwise
to adversely affect the conditions of his or her employment in many ways. 18
Thus, traditional concepts of conflict of interest suggest a second category
of cases in which some type of independent investigator is imperative: where
the target of the investigation is an officer of the Justice Department whose of-
fice is in the chain of command above the officer charged with undertaking
such investigations. Assuming the investigating officer was a U.S. Attorney,
this traditional conflict of interest problem would arise if the subject of the in-
vestigation was the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the As-
sistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division. If the target was a
U.S. Attorney, then the immediate subordinates of the U.S. Attorney would
experience a traditional conflict of interest in conducting the investigation.
Except in cases involving the Attorney General, these superior-subordinate
conflict of interest problems could presumably be handled by ordinary recusal
policy. Every Justice Department employee is subordinate to the Attorney
16. See generally, Beth Nollan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Lim-
its on the Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 Nw. U.L. REV. 57 (1992) (discussing
various types of financial conflicts of interest).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 528 (1994) (requiring disqualification of Justice Department prosecutors
for personal or financial conflict of interest); see generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICs 453-54 (1986).
. 18. Justice Department regulations involving disqualification for conflict of interest do not
expressly identify these circumstances as grounds for recusal, but the language of the regulations
is broad enough to cover the case. The subordinate and superior have "a close and substantial
connection of the type normally viewed as likely to induce partiality" and the superior has "a spe-
cific and substantial interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of the investigation or
prosecution." 28 C.F.R. §§ 45.2(a)(2) & (c)(2) (1998).
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General, and so the conflict of interest cannot be avoided where the Attorney
General is the target of the investigation. But if the Deputy Attorney General
or Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division or a U.S. Attorney is
the target, we can mandate recusals right down the line until we find a prose-
cutor who is not conflicted-presumably a civil service prosecutor who is not
a direct subordinate of the target. This prosecutor can report to the Attorney
General-who as a superior officer to the target does not have a traditional
conflict of interest problem-to see the investigation through to a satisfactory
conclusion. At a minimum, however, the traditional concept of conflict of in-
terest gives us a second case where an independent investigator will always be
required: where the target of the investigation is the Attorney General.
2. Political Conflict of Interest
The current Independent Counsel Act of course sweeps much more
broadly. It requires that an independent counsel be appointed to investigate
not only the President and the Attorney General, but also the Vice President,
all other cabinet officers, top White House staff, the Director and Deputy Di-
rector of the CIA, the director of the Internal Revenue Service, top presidential
campaign officials, and all important officials of the Justice Department
whether inside or outside the chain of command above the investigator. 19 One
common justification for requiring an independent investigator in this wider
set of circumstances rests on a nontraditional notion of conflict of interest-
what the Ethics in Government Act refers to as a "political conflict of inter-
est."
20
The phrase "political conflict of interest" was not further defined by Con-
gress. But the idea appears to be that the Justice Department has a conflict of
interest in conducting investigations that could prove to be politically embar-
rassing to the incumbent administration. 21 For example, assume the Presi-
dent's chief of staff is suspected of illegal drug use.22 Investigation by the
Justice Department would appear to present no conflict of interest in the tradi-
19. See 28 U.S.C. §591(b) (1994).
20. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 directs the Attorney General to develop rules and
regulations that require disqualification of Justice Department officers and employees when their
participation in an investigation or prosecution may result in "a political conflict of interest." 28
U.S.C. §528 (1994). The Independent Counsel Act, for its part, authorizes the Attorney General
to conduct a preliminary investigation and appoint an independent counsel in any case in which
he determines that investigation by the Justice Department would present a "political conflict of
interest." 28 U.S.C. §591(c)(1) (1994).
21. Cook, supra note 8, at 296.
22. See Arthur H. Christy, Trials and Tribulation of the First Special Prosecutor Under the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 86 GEO. L.J. 2287 (1998) (providing detailed account of in-
vestigation of Hamilton Jordan, then President Carter's chief of staff, who had been accused of
using cocaine in a Manhattan discotheque).
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tional sense-neither the Attorney General nor any other employee of the Jus-
tice Department can be fired or otherwise have their compensation or terms of
employment adversely effected by the chief of staff. Nevertheless, the Attor-
ney General and top Justice Department officials may perceive that the Presi-
dent and other party leaders will be displeased if the chief of staff is charged
with such a crime, because of the political embarrassment that would result.
Therefore, it is argued, the Attorney General and top Justice Department offi-
cials-who are part of the political team of the incumbent administration-
have a political conflict of interest that may prevent them from conducting
such an investigation in good faith.
Whether political conflict of interest is a concept that can be coherently
applied to determine when the Justice Department should be disqualified from
undertaking an investigation is doubtful. The problem with the concept is that
it naively assumes that we can neatly differentiate between politically-
motivated prosecutorial decisions and neutral or apolitical prosecutorial deci-
sions.
Historically, there is little support for the notion that decisions to prosecute
can be completely divorced from politics. Prosecutors are political animals.
Most state prosecutors are elected; federal prosecutors (primarily U.S. Attor-
neys) are presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation. A fair num-
ber of successful politicians (Thomas E. Dewy of New York and James R.
Thompson of Illinois immediately come to mind) have launched their careers
as aggressive prosecutors cleaning up graft and corruption associated with the
opposition party. Could any one realistically maintain that the decisions to
undertake these prosecutions have nothing to do with politics or indeed that
the prosecutors did not in some sense have a "political conflict of interest" in
pursuing their targets?
In any event, even if there were such a thing as the politically neutral
prosecutor, that prosecutor's investigation of a sitting President or high-
ranking executive branch officials could not be conducted in such a way as to
remain free of political controversy. The Lawrence Walsh investigation of the
Iran-Contra scandal provided a strong foretaste of this. Walsh, a life-long Re-
publican, was attacked by the Reagan White House for engaging in a
"partisan" investigation designed to harm the President and tarnish his leg-
acy. 23 The Starr investigation of President Clinton confirms it. I have little
doubt that Starr, a former D.C. Circuit judge and Solicitor General, has at-
tempted to conduct an investigation that, by his lights, is as objective, fair, and
by-the-book as is humanly possible.24 Yet as soon as the investigation began
23. See Gerard Lynch & Philip Howard, Special Prosecutors: What's the Point?, WASH.
POST, May 28, 1995, at C7.
24. I should disclose here that I served as a Deputy to Starr in 1989-90 when he was Solici-
tor General.
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to heat up, Starr was attacked by the White House and its political and media
allies as being a right-wing conspirator, a sex-obsessed Puritan zealot, and so
forth. In truth, no human being could have seriously pursued the Whitewater
and Lewinsky investigations without being characterized as politically biased
by the President and his allies-this was a central pillar of the President's legal
defense strategy. If there is a perfectly politically neutral prosecutor out there,
he or she will not be perceived as being political neutral by all segments of the
public once the political stakes in the investigation become sufficiently high.25
If every prosecutor will have a political bias-or at least can be portrayed
in the media as having a political bias-then the idea that the Justice Depart-
ment must automatically be replaced by an independent investigator when the
top officials in the Department have a "political conflict of interest" makes lit-
tle sense. In any case with high political stakes, every prosecutor will either be
"too soft" on the target or "too hard" on the target-or will be vulnerable to
being "spun" by the defense or by the allies of the prosecution as being too
soft or too hard.26 The Independent Counsel Act proceeds on the assumption
that the only significant political bias problem is the "too soft" problem. This
was perhaps an understandable assumption to make in the political climate
immediately following Watergate. But we know now that there is an equal
potential for bias in the opposite direction (real or "spun" by politicians to
sympathetic media outlets). The political bias or political conflict of interest
problem is universal and symmetrical (either too soft or too hard) and cannot
be escaped byappointing independent counsels; indeed, I will argue below
that the problem is probably exacerbated by appointing independent counsels.
The unworkability of the idea of political conflict of interest is indirectly
recognized in the Justice Department's regulations on prosecutorial disqualifi-
cation. The Ethics in Government Act, which gave us the independent coun-
sel, also requires that the Department promulgate regulations specifying when
prosecutors should be disqualified for "political conflict of interest., 27 The
Department's regulations restrict the scope of mandated recusals for political
conflict of interest very narrowly. The key term, "political relationship," is de-
fined to mean "a close identification with an elected official, a candidate,. . a
political party, or a campaign organization arising from service as a principal
adviser thereto or a principal official thereof.,28 In other words, a Justice De-
25. See Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A View From Inside, 86 GEO. L.J.
2307, 2352 (noting that "[elvery one of the six independent counsels who instituted criminal pro-
ceeding to date found himself pilloried by the media").
26. See Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 463, 464 (1996) ("One of the 'lessons' of the operation of the IC statute.. .is that
in cases of potentially great political import it creates partisan incentives to generate the very
appearance' problems that the statute sought to erase.").
27. 28 U.S.C. §518 (1994).
28. See 28 CFR §45.2(a) (1994).
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partment prosecutor should be recused from investigating a person only if that
persons is, say, an elected official with whom the Department official is
closely associated and formerly worked as a "principal adviser." The Depart-
ment's instincts in narrowly restricting the idea of political conflict of interest
are sound. Given that political motivation or at least the attribution of political
motivation is universal and symmetrical, giving free reign to this concept
would create endless possibilities for disqualification motions, together with a
host of unsolvable line-drawing conundrums. 29
In sum, the conflict of interest justification for independent investigators
turns out to be not very powerful. If confined to its traditional domain of fi-
nancial and personal conflicts and reasonable extrapolations therefrom, it pro-
vides a justification for using independent investigators in cases involving the
President and the Attorney General. Thus, the traditional understanding of
conflict of interest adds one new case (the Attorney General) to our prelimi-
nary list based on investigations leading to impeachment (the President). But
if extended to include political conflicts of interest, the concept fails to provide
a workable basis for identifying when an independent investigator is war-
ranted.
C. Appearance of Conflict
At this point, the advocates for the Independent Counsel Act trot out a
third justification-the argument based on the appearance of conflict of inter-
est. Indeed, the legislative histories of the renewals of the Independent Coun-
sel Act in 1983, 1987, and 1994 reveal this to be the most frequently cited jus-
tification for the statute.30
Despite its popularity, the "appearance" rationale also seems problematic,
at least if linked to the concept of conflict of interest. What is meant by ap-
pearance of conflict of interest appears to be roughly the same thing as is
meant by political conflict of interest-a situation where the Justice Depart-
ment is perceived as having an institutional incentive to go soft on the target of
an investigation because of the potential for political embarrassment to the in-
cumbent administration. 31 If this is so, then the argument based on the appear-
ance of conflict of interest shares the same basic failing as the argument from
29. This is confirmed by the Eight Circuit's decision in Starr v. Mandanici, 152 F.3d 741
(8th Cir. 1998). Mandanici, an attorney proceeding pro se, sought to disqualify Starr from further
investigation of Clinton because of the "political conflict of interest" caused by his acceptance of
the Deanship at Pepperdine Law School, and the funds provided to the school by Richard Scaife,
a wealthy Clinton opponent. The Eight Circuit held that Mandanici lacked standing to seek dis-
qualification, but two judges in a concurring opinion went on to express their deep skepticism
about whether the idea of "political conflict of interest" provides a meaningful basis for prosecu-
torial disqualification. Id. at 752-56 (Loken, J. joined by Beam, J., concurring).
30. See O'Sullivan, supra note 26, at 469-70.
31. Id. at 471-74.
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political conflict of interest: the potential for political bias (or attributions of
bias) in high-stakes cases is universal and symmetrical. Thus, if we do not
wish to mandate disqualification of prosecutors based on a political conflict of
interest, we should not mandate disqualification based on an appearance of
conflict of interest either.
This does not mean we should not be concerned about the potential for in-
stitutional bias when the executive department is asked to investigate itself.
From Teapot Dome to the Truman tax scandals to Watergate to the Inslaw
case, 32 concern about the potential for bias in having the executive branch in-
vestigate itself has given rise to some ad hoc arrangement for an independent
investigator. The problem is a recurring one, and has been seen as sufficiently
serious to call for an institutional response in the form of turning to an inde-
pendent investigator. But describing this problem in terms of an appearance of
conflict of interest is not particularly accurate or helpful. Appearance of con-
flict implies a discrete and identifiable problem (like financial conflict of inter-
est), where in fact the appearance of bias can come about from an ill-defined
mix of circumstances. And appearance of conflict implies that there is an easy
fix to the problem, in the form of mandatory recusal of Justice Department in-
vestigators, when in fact the solution to the problem entails a careful weighing
of the shortcomings of one institution against those of alternative institutions.33
Rather than discuss this problem in terms of an appearance of conflict of
interest, it would be better to speak of it as an appearance of partiality prob-
lem. Partiality can come from many different circumstances difficult to spec-
ify in advance. Perhaps a close family member of the President is a target of
an investigation, as happened with President Carter's brother Billy, or Presi-
dent Clinton's wife Hillary.34 Perhaps the target is a Vice President who is
32. For the use of independent prosecutors in Teapot Dome scandal, the Truman tax scandal,
and Watergate, see Harriger, supra note 4, at 491-497. The Inslaw case involved allegations of
wrongdoing by the Justice Department officials with respect to a contract involving litigation
support computer programs. Attorney General William Barr appointed Judge Nicholas Bua to
investigate these charges. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel,
86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2144 (1998).
33. Mandating automatic recusal in order to avoid appearances of conflict may also do af-
firmative damage in and of itself, either by deflecting attention from more serious problems
and/or by giving rise to strategic behavior. Peter Morgan, in an interesting article, argues that
Charles Keating and other savings and loan executives used concerns over "appearances of im-
propriety" by chief regulator Edwin Gray to deflect attention from real improprieties in the in-
dustry that Gray was beginning to uncover. Peter W. Morgan, The Appearance of Propriety:
Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593 (1992). Similarly, there have
been allegations that a broad independent counsel statute-justified as necessary to avoid appear-
ances of conflicts of interest-has been used by members of Congress to harass the executive
branch when it has been controlled by the opposition party.
34. See O'Sullivan, supra note 26, at 506 (noting that Attorney General Griffin Bell ap-
pointed a special counsel to investigate the "Carter Peanut Warehouse Case").
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perceived to be the likely head of the incumbent party's political ticket in the
next election. Perhaps the charges involve allegations of misconduct by the
Department of Justice itself or some of its key officials. It is far from clear that
it is possible to formulate a rule that will identify in advance the circumstances
in which an appearance of partiality will be present and sufficiently serious to
warrant an independent investigator.
A softer phrase like appearance of partiality may also deflect the impulse
to commit the Nirvana fallacy, assuming that identifying a problem with one
institution automatically entails the conclusion that some other institution will
do better. 35 If there were no countervailing considerations, then by all means
we should stamp out appearances of partiality. But there clearly are potential
countervailing considerations. Thus, the question whether we should modify
our political institutions in order to eliminate appearances of partiality should
await a fuller accounting of the benefits and costs of such a reform. If it turns
out that independent investigators impose large costs on the polity, then I
would be inclined to say that the concern with appearance of partiality does
not justify perpetuating such an institution. On the other hand, if we can de-
vise an office of independent investigations that performs reasonably well and
meshes satisfactorily with existing institutions, then it may make sense to call
upon such an institution in situations where the Justice Department's imparti-
ality may reasonably be questioned.
II. INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
We have now identified two circumstances in which independent investi-
gators are necessary-to investigate allegations that could lead to presidential
impeachment and to investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing by the
Attorney General-as well as a general problem difficult to specify in advance
where an independent investigator may be desirable-where there is an ap-
pearance of partiality associated with a Justice Department investigation. So
we know at a minimum that some kind of independent investigator will be re-
quired from time-to-time, and that it may be desirable to make relatively more
frequent use of independent investigators.
What are the institutional options for creating such an office? There are, it
seems to me, five basic options. Numerous variations on these options are
imaginable. But I will confine myself here to the basic options.
A. Executive Branch Option
The first option is to follow the path that prevailed up to and through the
35. See Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 J. LAW & SOC. INQ.
959, 965-66 (1997) (reviewing NEIL N. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994)).
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Watergate scandal-ad hoc appointment of independent prosecutors by the ex-
ecutive branch.36 Under this option, all investigations of high-level executive
officials would initially be conducted by Justice Department line prosecutors.
However, once these prosecutors became aware that the investigation might
lead to impeachment of the President or implication of the Attorney General,
or once they became concerned that their impartiality might be questioned-or
once public and/or congressional pressure for an independent prosecutor
mounted to a high enough level-an independent prosecutor would be named
by the Attorney General to take over the investigation. Presumably, this is the
option that will be adopted by default if the Independent Counsel Act is al-
lowed to expire in June.
The executive branch option is highly flexible and could be implemented
in a variety of ways. Under current law, the Attorney General has the author-
ity to appoint "special attorneys" when she deems it necessary or appropriate. 37
This authority could be exercised on an ad hoc basis, as it has been in the past.
Alternatively, the Justice Department could adopt standing regulations that
would specify the circumstances in which a special attorney must be named, as
well as the process for identifying and hiring such attorneys. In other words,
the Justice Department could by regulation adopt its own "independent coun-
sel" law that would attempt to regularize the process by which ordinary Justice
Department investigations are displaced in favor of independent investigations.
Various intermediate options between ad hoc appointment and a complete
code of regulations are possible. Whichever options are chosen, however, they
would all be the product of discretionary choices made by the executive
branch largely unconstrained by legislation.
B. Legislative Branch Option
The second option would be to rely on the legislative branch to undertake
investigations of high level executive officials when an independent investi-
gator is either necessary or desirable. This is in many respects the option that
flows most naturally from the language of the Constitution. The Constitution
says nothing about criminal prosecutions of incumbent executive officers, but
instead provides that they may be impeached by the House, tried by the Senate
and, if convicted, removed from office. 38 The power of impeachment extends
not only to the President and Vice President, but to "all civil officers of the
United States," 39 which would appear to include all executive branch officers
other than military officers.
Congress could readily conclude that it is "necessary and proper" in im-
36. See Harriger, supra note 4, at 13-39.
37. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 515, 543 (1994); see generally Kavanaugh, supra note 32, at 2139-40.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6-7.
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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plementing the impeachment power4° that an office independent of the execu-
tive be established to undertake the initial investigative work to build the case
for possible impeachment of the President, Vice President, or any other civil
officer. Given the extreme demands on legislative time that any impeachment
and trial impose, it is doubtful that Congress would actually start impeaching
many executive officials. But disclosure of damaging evidence uncovered by
the independent investigator would presumably be sufficient in many cases to
trigger a resignation or dismissal of errant officials, in which case they could
then be investigated for possible prosecution by ordinary prosecutors.
Again, there would be a variety of ways in which the legislative option
could be implemented. Congress could vote to expand the staff of the House
Judiciary Committee on an ad hoc basis whenever it became aware of the need
to initiate a possible impeachment investigation, or conceivably could perma-
nently expand the committee staff to include field investigators. Alternatively,
Congress could adopt legislation directing the General Accounting Office or
some other legislative agency to undertake investigations of executive officials
under specified circumstances. A third possibility, suggested by the referral
provision of the Independent Counsel Act,4 1 would be to enact legislation di-
recting executive branch investigators in the Department of Justice or FBI to
make referrals of information to the House whenever they uncover information
that might warrant impeachment.
C. Independent Counsel Option
The third option is the status quo - the Independent Counsel Act or some
variation thereon. If option one is the executive branch model, and option two
is the legislative branch model, the independent counsel option is the "fourth
branch" of government model. For the reality that has emerged under 'this
statute is that the independent counsel operates with at least as much inde-
pendence of the constitutional branches of government as the Federal Reserve
Board, if not more.
This extreme independence is largely a product of deliberate statutory de-
sign. The Independent Counsel Act establishes a low threshold for triggering
an independent counsel investigation. Whenever accusations of criminal ac-
tivity are leveled against a list of high-ranking executive branch officials, and
the Attorney General concludes after a brief preliminary investigation that
there are "reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation" is war-
ranted, the Attorney General is required to request appointment of an inde-
pendent counsel.42 The selection of the independent counsel is made by a spe-
cial panel of the D.C. Circuit appointed by the Chief Justice. The special
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994); see supra text accompanying note 13.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c) (1994).
1999)
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
panel also defines the independent counsel's jurisdiction and determines when
the independent counsel's investigation is over.
Once appointed, the independent counsel functions like a miniature Justice
Department. The independent counsel exercises "all investigative and prose-
cutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice." 43 The independ-
ent counsel may hire, fire and fix the compensation of such employees as the
counsel deems necessary, including investigators, attorneys, and consultants.
The Justice Department picks up the tab for all these expenses without limita-
tion. The independent counsel is directed, "except where not possible," to
"comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of
Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws."44 But no provision is
made for the enforcement of this directive. In conducting the investigation
and, if the independent counsel concludes it is warranted, prosecution of the
target of the investigation, the independent counsel functions without any ef-
fective supervision by the Attorney General or other high ranking Justice De-
partment officials.
For constitutional reasons, the statute provides that the Attorney General
can remove the independent counsel "for good cause, physical or mental dis-
ability (if not prohibited by law protecting persons from discrimination on the
basis of such disability), or any other condition that substantially impairs the
performance of such independent counsel's duties. 45 But this imposes little
or no constraint on independent counsels. The legislative history indicates that
"good cause" does not include a determination that the independent counsel is
not following Department policy.46 In any event, any Attorney General who
tried to fire an independent counsel for disregarding Department policies
would provoke a fire-storm of controversy, given memories of the "Saturday
night massacre" during Watergate. 47
It has been recently argued that the framers of the original Independent
Counsel Act envisioned that the special panel would play a more active role in
supervising the day-to-day activities of the independent counsel.48 But the
special panel has never been inclined to oversee the investigatory and prose-
cutory decisions of the independent counsel, and the Supreme Court in Morri-
son, in order to preserve the Act from separation of powers objections, em-
phatically stated that the special panel plays no supervisory role.49 As a result,
whatever the original drafters may have intended, the independent counsel has
43. Id. § 594(a).
44. Id. § 594(f).
45. Id. § 596(a). Any firing is expressly made subject to judicial review. Id. at § 596(a)(3).
46. See O'Sullivan, supra note 26, at 495.
47. Id.
48. See Gormley, supra note 8, at 678-684.
49. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 681 (1988).
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effectively operated as an unsupervised fourth branch of government.
Clearly, it is possible to tinker with the Act in order to reduce the inde-
pendence of the independent counsel. The Attorney General could be given
greater discretion in making referrals to the special panel, the special panel
could be given greater powers of oversight over the special counsel, and so
forth.50 But as long as the essential characteristics of the institution are re-
tained-appointment and termination by the special panel and institutional
separation from the Justice Department-the special counsel will continue to
function like a fourth branch of government.
D. Civil Service Option
Option four I will call the civil service model.5' This would entail the
creation within the Justice Department of a special office of career prosecutors
designated for the investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution of high-level
executive branch employees. The prosecutors in this office would be full-time
Justice Department employees, perhaps with some minimum number of years
of service, all of whom would be members of the protected civil service. The
closest existing institutional model would be the Public Integrity Section of the
Criminal Division, which investigates charges of corruption leveled against
federal judges and other public officials, and exercises some oversight of pub-
lic corruption investigations by U.S. Attorneys. Like the Public Integrity Sec-
tion, the proposed office of independent investigatibns might be charged with
investigating a range of public corruption cases, not just cases involving high-
level executive branch officials.52
In order to differentiate the civil service option from the executive branch
option, it would be necessary to make the head of such an office more inde-
pendent of the Attorney General than are ordinary political appointees of the
Department. There are various ways this might be done. One would be to
give the head of the office a status akin to a commissioner of an independent
regulatory agency, that is, to make the head a presidential appointee subject to
Senate confirmation, but with a fixed-term appointment (say, four years to co-
50. See Gormley, supra note 8, for a complete discussion of some of the possible changes
that would reign in independent counsels in this fashion.
51. I have previously endorsed this option, see Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, "Tenured"
Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1998), as has Professor Cass Sunstein. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2281 (1998). The original ar-
ticulation of the idea may be Andrew L. Frey & Kenneth S. Geller, Better Than Independent
Counsels, WASH. POST., Feb. 14, 1988, at C7.
52. A variant on the civil service option would be to establish the office as an independent
agency completely detached from the Justice Department. See Neil Kinkopf, The Case for a
Permanent Independent Counsel, WALL ST. J., March 30, 1999, at A26. I offer some reasons for
preferring to keep the office as an executive branch entity within the Justice Department infra at
note 96.
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incide with a presidential term of office) that could be cut short only for good
cause. Another would be to make the head a presidential appointee subject to
Senate confirmation, but limit the President to selecting the head from among
active career civil service prosecutors with certain minimum years of service.
This would mean that the head of the office could be reassigned elsewhere in
the Department by the Attorney General, but could not be fired from employ-
ment as a government prosecutor except for good cause. If the head were re-
assigned, the President would then have to appoint another head from within
the ranks of the civil service, or allow the ranking deputy to become the head.
Independence could be further maintained by mandating the recusal from
participation in prosecutorial decisions of any officer of the Justice Depart-
ment who would have a traditional conflict of interest in the matter; i.e., any
officer who is a subordinate of an individual under investigation. Thus, the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and possibly the head of the
Criminal Division (if the independent investigator ordinarily reports to or con-
sults with the Criminal Division) would be recused by law in investigations
involving the President. But in cases in which superior officers of the Justice
Department would not be recused because of a traditional conflict of interest
(e.g., investigation of a cabinet officer other than the Attorney General), the
independent investigator might remain subject to the ordinary channels of re-
view and oversight by higher ranking officers of the Department.
The civil service opti6n would differ from the independent counsel be-
cause the office would be a permanent functioning unit of the Justice Depart-
ment. Thus, it would be subject to all rules, policies, and practices of the De-
partment, much as a U.S. Attorney's office operates. It would have a
predetermined annual budget, and would have to determine how best to spend
this budget in investigating and prosecuting the various matters assigned to the
office for investigation. Core cases that require the use of an independent in-
vestigator would by law be assigned to the office (i.e., those implicating the
President, the Attorney General, and probably other high ranking Justice De-
partment officials). But other cases that present only a possible appearance of
partiality could be assigned either to the independent investigator or to the
Criminal Division or a U.S. Attorney on a case-by-case basis, depending on
relative work loads and an assessment of the potential for an appearance of
partiality if investigation were undertaken by regular Justice Department
prosecutors.
E. Inspector General Option
The final option, which has been suggested by Kathleen Clark and Mi-
chael Bromwich,53 would be to have inspectors general investigate charges of
53. Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government: An Inspector General for the White
House, 49 MERCER L. REV. 553 (1998); Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations:
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misconduct by executive officials. This is in many respects the most innova-
tive suggestion. Unlike the four previous options, inspectors general do not.
engage in investigations for purposes of bringing criminal charges against in-
dividual wrongdoers. Instead, they engage in noncriminal investigations of
misfeasance within government agencies, provide regular audits of govern-
ment programs, and make recommendations to agency heads about reforms
that might improve agency performance. 54 If inspectors general uncover spe-
cific evidence of individual wrongdoing in the course of their investigations,
they either refer the matter to the Justice Department for prosecution, or refer
the information to the agency for possible discipline of employees. A prime
venue for inspectors general is the Congress, where they make reports twice a
year and are often featured in oversight hearings.
55
The most intriguing aspect of the inspector general option is that it would
largely decriminalize the current system for investigating wrongdoing by high
level executive officials. The objective of independent investigations of ex-
ecutive branch wrongdoing would be disclosure to Congress and the public,
not an indictment. Thus, the inspector general model would rely on public
opinion, rather than criminal sanctions, to deter illegal activity by executive
branch officials. This would arguably diffuse the extremely partisan atmos-
phere that has surrounded independent counsel investigations.
Inspectors general enjoy more independence than ordinary political ap-
pointees, but less than independent counsels. Inspectors general are presiden-
tial appointees subject to Senate confirmation. They may be removed by the
President, but only if a statement of reasons for the removal is supplied to
Congress. 56 This has tended to give inspectors general a kind of quasi-tenure,
and often they remain in office even if control of the government changes
hands. On the other hand, inspectors general are permanent institutions that
operate under fixed budgets. Thus, they tend to be selective in the matters
they investigate and they resolve matters more expeditiously than independent
counsels.57
III. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
Those are the basic options: the executive branch model, the legislative
branch model, the independent counsel model, the civil service model, and the
inspector general model. How then should we chose among them?
The ultimate standard or criterion should be how well each option would
perform in practice. This in turn is largely a function of how often each option
The Inspector General Model, 86 GEO L.J. 2027 (1998).
54. Clark, supra note 53, at 560.
55. Id.
56. Bromwich, supra note 53, at 2029.
57. Id. at 2028, 2039.
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would "get it right," meaning how often it would avoid both false negatives-
failing to detect and prosecute serious executive branch misconduct-and false
positives-investigating or prosecuting officials who are innocent or whose
conduct does not warrant criminal investigation or prosecution. 58 False nega-
tives are undesirable, insofar as they permit criminal misconduct by high level
officials to go unsanctioned, because they undermine the rule of law and pub-
lic confidence in government. False positives are also undesirable, because
they impose unwarranted anxiety and expense on investigated officials, create
a disincentive to others to undertake executive branch service, perpetuate an
atmosphere of pervasive scandal which also undermines public confidence in
government, and generally contribute to the poisoning of the political envi-
ronment in Washington. The best (or least worse) institutional option should
be the one that minimizes the sum of the costs associated with these false
negatives and false positives.
We obviously have no data by which to assess the untried options (the
legislative branch option, the civil service option, and the inspector general
option). With respect to the options that have been tried (the executive branch
option before 1978 and the independent counsel option after 1978), the only
thing that can be said with much confidence is that the independent counsel
option appears to generate a large number of false positives. Of the twenty in-
dependent counsel investigations authorized since 1978, a majority (eleven)
have resulted in no charges being filed.59 In those matters where charges have
been filed, a significant number have resulted in acquittals or reversals of con-
victions on appeal. Thus, the independent counsel option has generated all the
costs associated with high levels of false positives. Of course, we have no way
of directly knowing how many false negatives are associated with the inde-
pendent counsel option, or whether this number is lower than it would be un-
der other options.
In the absence of hard information about the propensity of the different
options to generate false negatives or false positives, it is necessary to fall back
on structural variables that may serve as rough proxies for the propensities of
the different options to perform in different ways. I suggest three such vari-
ables. Two of these variables entail well-known trade offs or alternatives in
organizing any office of independent investigations: independence versus ac-
58. False negatives are often referred to as "Type II error," and false positives as "Type I
error".
59. Nine publicly disclosed investigations resulted in no indictments. See Donald C. Smaltz,
The Independent Counsel: A View from the Inside, 86 GEO L.J. 2307, 2323-24 (1998) (table). In
addition, two investigations, one terminated in 1989 and the other in 1992, remain sealed. See
Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 2283-85 app. Given the small reported cost of these sealed
investigations (and the strong tradition of public trials in the United States), presumably these
investigations were also terminated without charges being brought, bringing the total of cases
without indictments to 11 out of 20.
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countability and transience versus permanence. The third variable, how well
the office comports with established constitutional traditions, does not affect
the performance of the office so much as its perceived legitimacy, which is
also an important factor in determining the general standing of the office in the
eyes of the public.
A. Independence Versus Accountability
The first variable, independence versus accountability, reflects what is
probably the most fundamental trade-off in designing an office of independent
investigations. Independence here refers primarily to independence from the
President and the Attorney General. The independent investigator, almost by
definition, must have a degree of independence from these officials. More
generally, we can speak of independence from any political body that might
wish to influence a decision to prosecute for partisan reasons. As we have
seen, it is impossible, certainly in cases with high political stakes, to remove
all political considerations from prosecutions. But it is possible to design an
office with greater or lesser degrees of insulation from those elected officials
who have the greatest interest in the political implications of a prosecution.
Against this desire for independence must be balanced the desirability of
assuring that the investigator remains accountable. Accountable here means
liable to be called to account, or to answer for, one's responsibilities and con-
duct in office. 60 An accountable prosecutor is one who must be made to an-
swer for his or her decisions to the public, either by periodically standing for
election or by being subject to oversight and possibly to removal by those who
must stand for election. By making prosecutors accountable, we encourage
them to make prosecutorial decisions that are broadly acceptable to the public.
These two desiderata, independence and accountability, exist in significant
tension. As Katy Harriger observes, "[t]he independence of the prosecutor
cannot be guaranteed without risking the creation of an unaccountable and
dangerous law enforcement agent." 61 Moreover, each of these desired traits is
associated with reducing one of the two basic types of costs discussed above.
Independence is associated with reducing the costs of false negatives, because
an independent prosecutor will presumably be more fearless in rooting out ex-
ecutive branch wrongdoing than a prosecutor who is beholden to the President
and the Attorney General. Conversely, accountability is associated with re-
ducing the costs of false positives, because an accountable prosecutor will be
sensitive to the direct and indirect costs of commencing prosecutions that ei-
60. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); see also WEBSTER'S NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 16 (2d ed. 1956) ("Accountable" means
"Liable to be called on to render an account; answerable; as, every man is accountable to God for
his conduct").
61. Harriger, supra note 4, at 515.
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ther come to naught or expose wrongdoing the public regards as too insub-
stantial to warrant criminal sanctions.
The principal conclusion that follows from these reflections is that the of-
fice of independent investigations must reflect some kind of accommodation or
compromise between independence and accountability. Pursuit of total inde-
pendence at the expense of all accountability makes no sense. To begin with,
such "independence" is illusory: complete political neutrality in prosecutions
is unachievable, and the more one detaches the investigator from one branch or
party, the more likely he or she is to fall under the influence of the other
62 fnaetly otparty. More fundamentally, maximizing independence drives down the costs
associated with false negatives at the expense of incurring higher costs associ-
ated with false positives. On the other hand, pursuit of total accountability at
the expense of all independence makes no sense either, because this would
drive down the costs of false positives at the expense of incurring higher costs
in the form of false negatives.
One mechanism of accommodation that may be especially promising is to
insist that the independent investigator undergo public scrutiny and approval
before he or she is appointed. The standard mechanism for doing this is
through the appointment of the independent investigator as a principal officer
of the United States, requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirma-
tion.63 Such an appointment compromises independence to a degree, by al-
lowing the President to pick his own prosecutor and by allowing the Senate to
veto the President's choice of his own prosecutor. But if the appointment oc-
curs ex ante-before any particular controversy has arisen that requires inves-
tigation-and if the prosecutor's conduct in any investigation is not subject to
the review or sanction of the President or the Attorney General, then signifi-
cant independence can be preserved in the way the chosen prosecutor executes
his or her duties. On the other hand, although such pre-appointment scrutiny
and approval would not make the independent investigator actually account-
able for particular decisions after the fact, it would assure at least that the
identity and credentials of the investigator are satisfactory to a broad cross
section of the polity, and would underscore to the investigator that the public
has a vital interest in how any investigations will be carried out. Thus, ap-
pointment as a principal officer would to some degree act as a substitute for
after-the-fact accountability in assuring that the prosecutor's decisions are ac-
ceptable to the public.
B. Transience Versus Permanence
The second variable, transience versus permanence, is less often discussed
62. See Steven B. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 82-84 (1995).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
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in the literature but is also of vital importance. Transience here refers to a
structure in which the independent investigator is created for the duration of
one particular investigation, after which the office is terminated. When the
need for another investigation arises, a new independent prosecutor is ap-
pointed. Permanence refers to a structure in which the independent investiga-
tor is a standing institution that undertakes all investigations falling within a
particular description as they arise. Particular individuals may come and go as
the heads or principal investigators of such an office, but the office itself en-
joys on-going continuity of staff, procedures, and traditions from one case to
the next.
Congress was well aware of the choice between transience and perma-
nence when it adopted the Independent Counsel Act in 1978, and it deliber-
ately chose transience.64 Transience has some clear advantages. It probably
facilitates the recruitment of high caliber lawyers, who may not want to com-
mit to becoming career prosecutors but are willing to interrupt their careers in
private practice or academia to work on a single high-profile case. It probably
reduces the danger of "capture" associated with any permanent office that in-
teracts frequently with other actors; in this case, the danger that a permanent
office (on either the civil service or inspector general models) would come to
identify too closely with the politicians they would be asked to investigate.
Finally, a transient office is easier to characterize as an "inferior" office, and
hence easier to sustain against constitutional objections based on the lack of
presidential appointment or on separation of powers grounds.
On the other hand, a transient office has a number of costs, which may not
have been appreciated very clearly in 1978. A transient office must be organ-
ized from scratch, requiring that prosecutors be recruited, office space rented,
equipment purchased, and support staff hired.65 This slows down investiga-
tions, and increases costs. There is no institutional memory to provide guid-
ance as to how to handle problems that arise, which again slows down investi-
gations and increases costs. More seriously, because the investigator has only
one case involving one individual (or at most a few related individuals), there
is an incentive to probe especially hard and to err on the side of finding crimi-
nality. In part, this is because of a natural human tendency to uncover some
criminality to justify all the expense and bother of instituting an independent
investigation; in part it is because a transient office has no context in which to
compare the misdeeds of the target with other potentially more serious cases.
Finally, a transient office has little incentive to preserve the norms of the
prosecutorial office, since it will not have to interact with courts and other ex-
ecutive branch officials in the future. Thus, rules and understandings about
grand jury secrecy, preserving executive privileges, maintaining diplomatic
64. Harriger, supra note 4, at 501-04.
65. Smaltz, supra note 59, at 2335.
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confidences, etc. may be eroded by transient independent investigators. 66
A permanent office has virtues and vices that roughly mirror those of a
transient office. A permanent office has its institutional infrastructure in place,
which facilitates more rapid start up and completion of investigations. It has
an institutional memory, which provides ready answers to most problems that
arise. It has a portfolio of cases, and thus must rank-order the cases in terms of
seriousness, allocating resources and time accordingly. 67 It will interact on an
on-going basis with courts and other executive branch agencies, and thus has
an incentive to preserve prosecutorial norms. Finally, because it has a perma-
nent institutional existence, such an office is likely to develop a reputation
over time with the general public (whether positive or negative). If the office
performs well, it will build a reservoir of legitimacy that can help it weather
times of political turbulence. 6
8
On the other hand, a permanent office may attract less ambitious and tal-
ented lawyers, and may come to identify with the political chiefs of the incum-
bent administration in a way that discourages aggressive investigation of al-
leged wrongdoing. A permanent office that is significantly independent also
presents the danger of what my colleague Steven Calabresi calls the "J. Edgar
Hoover syndrome." In particular, such a office presents the danger of creating
a powerful and unaccountable apparatchnik who collects dirt on politicians of
all stripes, and then uses this information to expand and perpetuate his own
role as a power-broker within the government.
If we take a step back, we can see that the choice between transience and
permanence again parallels the two principal types of costs that we should
seek to minimize in designing an office of independent investigations. A tran-
sient office, by concentrating its firepower on a single case and creating incen-
tives to engage in an especially aggressive investigation of that case, errs on
the side of over-prosecution and hence functions to minimize the costs of false
negatives. In contrast, a permanent office, by forcing the investigator to ration
time and effort among multiple cases, and by providing incentives to preserve
prosecutorial norms, trims in the direction of prosecutorial restraint and hence
functions to minimize the costs of false positives.
With respect to the trade-off between transience and permanence, it is less
clear that it is possible to reach some compromise between competing values.
It may be that in the end we are forced to make a basic choice between either
the transience model or the permanence model, and hence must live with the
basic package of advantages and disadvantages associated with each. Never-
66. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Flaw in the Law, THE AMERICAN LAW. 13 (1998).
67. See O'Sullivan, supra note 26, at 491-92.
68. This probably explains how an institution like the Supreme Court can render decisions in
controversial areas upsetting to many people, but still have its judgments obeyed by lower courts
and state officials.
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theless, some accommodating should be possible. For example, if the tran-
sience option is chosen, greater emphasis could be placed on requiring the in-
dependent investigator to use full time Justice Department prosecutors detailed
to the independent investigation. 69 Alternatively, if the permanence option is
chosen, the risk of creating another J. Edgar Hoover could be ameliorated by
imposing a maximum limit on the years that the head of the permanent office
of independent investigations may serve. Indeed, Congress has already
adopted such a provision with respect to the FBI, whose head is now limited
by statute to serving a maximum of ten years. 70 Thus, even if a basic choice
must be made between one model or the other, we should remain alert to modi-
fications that help overcome the distinctive problems associated with each.
C. Constitutional Concerns
The third variable, devising an office that conforms to constitutional re-
quirements, has received by far the most attention in the literature. Conse-
quently, I shall restrict my remarks to offering a bare outline of the salient con-
siderations.
Three constitutional limitations are especially important to an office of in-
dependent investigations designed to root out high level crimes in the execu-
tive branch. The first is the Appointments Clause. If the independent investi-
gator is a superior officer of the United States, then he or she must be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.71 If the independent
investigator is an inferior officer, then his or her appointment may be vested by
Congress in "the Courts of Law" or "the Heads of Departments. 72 The Inde-
pendent Counsel Act vests the appointment of the independent counsel in an
Article III court, and the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson upheld this ar-
rangement, reasoning that the independent counsel may properly be regarded
as an inferior officer for Appointments Clause purposes.73
The Court's reasoning in support of this conclusion is questionable at best.
The Court stressed formal factors, some of which are of doubtful relevance:
that the independent counsel can be removed by the Attorney General for good
cause, 74 that the counsel has no authority to set policy, and that the counsel's
office is temporary and of limited jurisdiction. 75 Justice Scalia, in dissent, ar-
69. A step in this direction was taken in the 1994 amendments, and the Act now provides
that administrative personnel and other employees of the Justice Department may be detailed to
the staff of the independent counsel at his request. 28 U.S.C. § 594(d)(1) (1994).
70. 28 U.S.C.A. § 532 (1993).
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
72. Id.
73. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671-72 (1988).
74. Id. The relevance of this is puzzling, since cabinet officers can be removed by the Presi-
dent at will, and they are clearly regarded as superior officers.
75. Id.
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gued more persuasively that aiy officer who is not subject to the supervision
of a superior officer cannot be an inferior officer. Consequently, the unsuper-
vised independent counsel cannot be regarded as inferior.76
In a more recent Supreme Court opinion explicating the Appointments
Clause, the Court (speaking through Justice Scalia) opined that inferior offi-
cers are those "whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others
who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of
the Senate. 77 In other words, the Court appeared to adopt the very test urged
by Justice Scalia in dissent in Morrison. It would be premature to declare that
Morrison has now been "overruled" and that any independent investigator
must be a presidential appointee subject to Senate confirmation 78 The holding
of the Court rendered in a 7-1 landmark decision has more gravitational force
than the reasoning of a minor decision authored by the sole dissenter in the
earlier case.
Nevertheless, I would argue that the Scalia position here is more in keep-
ing with our long-standing constitutional traditions. Certainly the Scalia view
conforms more closely to the common sense understanding of what sorts of
officers are important enough to be regarded as superior. Even if it were mar-
ginally plausible to describe independent counsel Alexia Morrison as an
"inferior" officer in her investigation of whether Assistant Attorney General
Ted Olson lied to Congress, it strains credulity to describe either Lawrence
Walsh or Ken Starr as inferior officers. There is nothing inferior about an in-
dependent investigator who seeks to bring down a President and achieve what
amounts to a regime change. Therefore it would be both prudent and proper
for Congress to make any independent investigators established by future leg-
islation presidential appointees.
The second constitutional constraint is based on the President's removal
power. Article II's Vesting and Take Care Clauses have been read as confer-
ring the "executive power" exclusively on the President, and important prece-
dent prior to Morrison appeared to say that if an officer performs a purely ex-
ecutive function, then the President must have the power to remove that officer
at will.79 Only if the power can be construed as something other than purely
executive may Congress condition the President's power of termination upon a
finding of good cause. 80 Since the power to prosecute crimes is typically re-
garded as purely executive, this suggests that the Independent Counsel Act is
76. Id. at 720-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
78. As suggested by Akhil Amar and others. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112
HARV. L. REV. 747, 810-11 (1999); Nick Braven, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law?
The Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998).
79. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
80. See generally Humphrey's Ex'r. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener v.
United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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unconstitutional insofar as the Attorney General can remove an independent
counsel-a federal prosecutor-only for good cause.
Morrison avoided this conclusion by reinterpreting the removal prece-
dents. Its "present considered view," the Court said, was that the scope of the
President's removal power ought not to turn solely on whether the powers ex-
ercised by an official can be characterized as being '"purely executive." 81 In-
stead, "the real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a na-
ture that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional
duty." 82 Relying on such factors as the "inferior" status of the independent
counsel, the fact that the Attorney General was not totally disabled from re-
moving an independent counsel, and the importance of preserving the inde-
pendence of the office, the Court concluded that the limitation on the Presi-
dent's removal power was constitutional.
The Court's disposition of the removal issue was as much a departure from
constitutional tradition as was its disposition of the Appointments Clause is-
sue. Yet I am somewhat more sympathetic to its revisionism in this context.
The old distinction in removal jurisprudence based on whether the power be-
ing exercised was "purely executive" as opposed to "quasi-legislative" or
"quasi-judicial" was threadbare, and bore no relation to the actual powers that
modem independent regulatory agencies-headed by commissioners who may
be removed only for good cause-actually exercise. 83 In this sense, current
constitutional practice is out of line with the conceptualism of the older prece-
dents. Thus, I think Congress would be on firmer ground in imposing a good
cause requirement on removal of an independent investigator.
That being said, some caution is still in order here. Morrison appears to
endorse a functionalist test for determining whether the President's executive
power has been unduly diminished. Whether the President has an unfettered
power of removal power is but one element in this inquiry. To the extent that
Congress takes away the power to remove at will an executive official, it is
important that other constraints on such an officer be preserved so as to avoid
fragmenting the President's ultimate control over executive branch policy.
The third constitutional constraint involves the role of the federal courts.
Article III appears to limit the courts to deciding cases and controversies, and
thus as a rule "executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial character
may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitu-
tion." 84 The Independent Counsel Act appears to run afoul of this principle,
by vesting in the special panel the power to appoint the independent counsel,
81. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988).
82. Id. at 691.
83. See Geoffrey F. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 65-83 (reviewing
evolution of powers of independent agencies).
84. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976).
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the power to define the counsel's jurisdiction, and the power to terminate the
counsel's investigation.
Morrison was clearly uncomfortable with the Article III challenge to the
Independent Counsel Act. It upheld the power to appoint on the ground that
Article III courts are expressly given the power to appoint "inferior" officers.
85
It narrowly construed the power to determine the counsel's jurisdiction by
suggesting that the special panel had little discretion in this matter. 86 It nar-
rowly construed the panel's power to terminate an investigation so as to avoid
any suggestion that the Article III court may remove the counsel from office.
87
And it disclaimed any power on behalf of the special panel to supervise the in-
vestigations of the independent counsel.88
The impression one gets after this radical surgery is that the Morrison
Court was stretching to the limit to uphold the role of the special panel in in-
dependent counsel investigations. Given that a key premise of the Court's
holding-that the independent counsel is an inferior officer-is highly ques-
tionable, it would be dangerous to read Morrison as sanctioning a significant
administrative role for Article III courts in future independent counsel investi-
gations. Moreover, now that the impartiality of the special panel has been
challenged in the Whitewater and Lewinsky investigations, the Court will al-
most certainly be more wary in the future of approving innovative roles for
Article III courts that threaten to inject them into major political controversies.
Thus, it would probably be advisable for Congress to keep Article III courts
out of the process of administering future independent investigators. Federal
courts should be left to deciding cases brought by independent investigators,
not supervising them.
The central conclusion I would draw from this brief survey of constitu-
tional issues is that it would be a mistake to treat Morrison as having resolved
all constitutional doubts in favor of independent counsels and analogous in-
stitutions. Morrison is a deviant decision in most respects, and should not be
regarded as establishing a constitutional safe harbor for all innovations de-
signed to facilitate investigations of executive officials. 89 Instead, the consti-
tutional issues raised by such legislation should be viewed from a longer term
perspective, and should regarded as an important element affecting the legiti-
macy of the office of independent investigations. In the final analysis, the le-
gitimacy of the office will be a function of how well it minimizes the sum of
the costs associated with false negatives and false positives. It will certainly
85. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 679.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 682-83.
88. Id. at 681.
89. I am not alone in this assessment. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Now Playing... A Con-
stitutional Nightmare, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1998, at C1.
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help if the office is perceived by the public as resting comfortably within our
constitutional traditions, as opposed to being an alien intrusion.
IV. ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
Applying the foregoing criteria, it should be apparent that there is no per-
fect choice for the institutional design of an independent investigator. Inde-
pendence and accountability are in considerable tension with one another, so
any arrangement for assuring independence will entail some sacrifice in ac-
countability, and any movement toward greater accountability will entail some
sacrifice in independence. Transience and permanence are largely mutually
exclusive, and each has advantages and disadvantages. Constitutional consid-
erations impose further constraints on the available range of choices. Never-
theless, when we take all three criteria into account, I think that the civil serv-
ice option is the best of an imperfect lot. Before defending that judgment, I
will offer some brief comments as to why the independent counsel option and
the other institutional options are even more seriously flawed.
A. The Independent Counsel - Worst Choice
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion of structural variables
that the independent counsel is an extremist solution. The drafters of the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act created an office positioned as far as toward the inde-
pendence pole of the independent-accountability scale as is constitutionally
conceivable. The counsel is not a presidential appointee, and-hence is not re-
quired to undergo the process of Senate confirmation. He or she exercises the
powers of the Justice Department, but is not subject to any meaningful over-
sight by the Justice Department. The prospect of removal for good cause is
politically too remote to be of any significance. Nor does the special panel ex-
ercise effective control over the counsel.
The drafters also created an office as far toward the transience pole of the
transience-permanent scale as imaginable. The independent counsel has a case
load of one. The counsel pursues this case with a newly assembled staff, many
of whom have never worked in a prosecutor's office before. There is no in-
stitutional memory; no requirement of living within a fixed budget; no need to
make judgments about how scarce resources of time and limited personnel
should be allocated among competing concerns. Basically, the independent
counsel has no long term institutional perspective.
Together, these structural features give us an institution that ruthlessly
seeks to minimize false negatives-undetected executive branch wrongdo-
ing-but at the expense of driving up false positives-investigations and
prosecutions of executive officials that are unwarranted in the eyes of the pub-
lic. This strong skewing would be justified only if the costs of false negatives
were thought to be very large (perhaps because of pervasive but difficult-to-
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detect corruption in the executive branch) and/or if the costs of false positives
were thought to be comparably trivial (perhaps because executive officials are
indifferent to being criminally prosecuted). But few people believe that the
first of these judgments is accurate, and the second is clearly false. Thus, be-
cause the Independent Counsel Act strikes a bad balance between reducing the
costs of false negatives and false positives, it is a very unlikely candidate to
produce the most satisfactory results overall (minimization of the sum of the
two costs).
What may be worse, the skewed strategy of the Independent Counsel Act
has reduced the effectiveness of the independent counsel even as a tool for fer-
reting out executive misconduct. The independent counsel is almost com-
pletely unaccountable; as a transient institution it lacks any reservoir of repu-
tation or good will with the public; and it is perceived to be an odd duck in
terms of recognized constitutional structures. This has made the independent
counsel extremely vulnerable to attack by those under investigation and by
their media sympathizers. Walsh, for instance, was pilloried by the editorial
page of the Wall Street Journal, which portrayed him as a vicious partisan out
to get Reagan and Bush. 90 And Starr has been subject to an even more ruthless
smear campaign by the Clinton White House and its surrogates. These attacks
succeeded in undermining public support for both investigations. Because the
political stakes are so high in cases involving high-level executive wrongdo-
ing, it is critical that the independent investigator have significant legitimacy
in the eyes of the public. The independent counsel fails utterly on this score.
The transient nature of the independent counsels exacts its toll in other,
probably less significant, ways. This feature drags out the time it takes to
complete investigations and drives up the costs. It creates an institution that
has little or no incentive to abide by Justice Department policies, to adhere to
traditional prosecutorial norms than have evolved over time, or to preserve
principles like executive privilege or the confidentiality of grand jury pro-
ceedings.
The net result has been a disaster for our polity. The investigation of high
level executive officials has become a kind of blood sport within the American
political scene, exacerbating partisan hostility, spawning public cynicism
about government, and driving talented people out of the process.91 The courts
have been drawn into political disputes, traditional legal norms have been
trashed, and impeachment now threatens to become a standard feature of po-
litical life. This is quite a record for one piece of do-good legislation. Con-
gress should drive a stake through the heart of the Independent Counsel Act
and hope that nothing of its kind ever walks the face of the earth again.
90. See Lynch & Howard, supra note 23.
91. See O'Sullivan, supra note 26, at 471; Sunstein, supra note 59, at 2269-71.
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B. Other Bad Ideas
I will offer relatively brief observations about three other options. The
legislative branch option appears on its face to satisfy both the independence
and accountability objectives. Certainly, an investigator located in the staff of
the House Judiciary Committee or in the General Accounting Office would
have more than ample independence from theAttorney General. Such an of-
fice would also be accountable to Members of Congress, who are elected by
the people.
But the independence of the legislative investigator from the executive
branch would be achieved only at the expense of creating an office that would
be highly dependent on the legislative branch. A legislative branch investiga-
tor would be closely controlled by the congressional leadership of the party in
majority control of Congress. Thus, the "independence" of such an investiga-
tor would not be true independence from partisan politics; it would just sub-
stitute one form of political dependence for another.
The close partisan control of the legislative branch investigator would
make it extremely difficult to reach a proper level of intensity of investigations
into executive branch wrongdoing. If the President and the Congress were
controlled by the same party, then the legislative, investigator would be just as
unlikely if not more unlikely to uncover wrongdoing than if the investigation
were left to regular Justice Department prosecutors. On the other hand, if the
President and the Congress were controlled by different parties, as seems to be
the case more often than not these days, then the legislative investigator might
well become excessively zealous in its investigations of possible wrongdoing.
Criminal investigations of the executive would become even more a weapon of
partisan politics than is the case under the independent counsel today.
I also have concerns about whether a legislative investigator would de-
velop a long term perspective and-a reputation for professionalism. This could
happen, but there is no preexisting tradition of criminal investigatory opera-
tions within the congressional staff, and building this kind of institutional
capital would take patience and dedication, which seem often in short supply
on the Hill.
The inspector general option is intriguing, primarily because it promises to
defuse the tensions created by criminalizing political disputes. The main
question here would be whether inspectors general would be effective in un-
covering executive branch crimes. Inspectors general have the power to issued
administrative subpoenas for the production of documents, 92 but they do not
have the power to issue testimonial subpoenas. Perhaps more critically, they
do not have power to grant immunity from prosecution. This is a critical tool
in unraveling conspiracies and cover-ups of the most serious breaches by the
92. Bromwich, supra note 53, at 2036.
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executive, as in Watergate.
The White House has also steadfastly rejected the introduction of any in-
spector general into the Executive Office of the President, citing separation of
powers concerns.93 This is understandable, given the intensely political nature
of White House operations, and the close association between inspectors gen-
eral and Congress. It might be nice if the White House would let the sun shine
in on every discussion and meeting that occurs in and around the Oval Office,
but that is unrealistic. If inspectors general and the White House do not mix,
then it is not plausible to think that inspectors general can be a general solution
to the problem of executive branch investigations.
The executive branch option-ad hoc appointment of independent prose-
cutors at the discretion of the Attorney General-may be in fact the second-
least-worst choice. Certainly this option has the virtue of being time tested.
This was the option followed for roughly the first 180 years of our political
existence, and no great disaster befell the republic. Based on the test of expe-
rience alone, the executive branch option would have to be rated as superior to
the independent counsel option.
The Watergate episode provides support for this conclusion. Foes of the
independent counsel statute often cite Watergate as an example of how execu-
tive branch scandals can be thoroughly and independently investigated without
an Independent Counsel Act. This is true, although Watergate does not sug-
gest that we can do without independent investigators. It only suggests that it
is possible to do without a standing independent counsel law. Public pressure
in the Watergate scandal forced the Attorney General to appoint two inde-
pendent prosecutors (Cox and Jaworksi) without a statutory mandate. Indeed,
recent experience suggests that whenever potential impeachable offenses are
involved, as was the case in Watergate, Iran-Contra, and Lewinsky, public and
Congressional pressure will quite likely always compel the appointment of an
investigator independent of the Attorney General, whether there is a standing
law that calls for one or not.94
Nevertheless, the executive branch option clearly has its flaws. Where in-
vestigations involve lesser executive branch officials such as White House
aides and cabinet offers, this option may err too much on the side of account-
ability at the expense of independence. Without a law mandating the investi-
gation of such cases by an office having a significant degree of independence,
the initial investigation would be undertaken by regular Justice Department
officials subject to oversight by political appointees. Given the natural ten-
93. Clark, supra note 53, at 562.
94. Not only were independent prosecutors appointed during Watergate without a statute
mandating that this be done, but Attorney General Janet Reno, acting on her own authority, ap-
pointed Robert Fisk as an independent prosecutor to investigate Whitewater at a time when the
Independent Counsel Act had been allowed to lapse.
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dency of the leadership of the Justice Department to protect the President and
his party, there would be a danger that the Department would go easy on such
targets in such investigations. And given the confidentiality of criminal inves-
tigations, it is possible that the decision to forego prosecution would never be
publicly disclosed. It is too much to expect that some Woodward and Bern-
stein will always come along to expose high-level executive wrongdoing that
the Justice Department has failed to uncover or has investigated and incor-
rectly concluded not to prosecute.
The executive branch strategy also results in the appointment of ad hoc,
one-shot special prosecutors, who share many of the same vices as the inde-
pendent counsel. Although independent prosecutors would undoubtedly be
appointed less frequently than they are under the Independent Counsel Act,
when they were appointed they would tend to behave the same way the one-
shot independent counsels perform under the Act-slowly, expensively, with-
out much sensitivity to established Department policies and prosecutorial
norms, and with a zealous proclivity to err on the side of finding criminal
wrongdoing. Given that such ad hoc special prosecutors would also not be
presidential appointees and would lack an established institutional reputation,
they would also encounter the same vulnerabilities regarding their perceived
legitimacy that have plagued independent counsels.
C. The Civil Service Model - Least Worst Choice
The civil service option-an office of 'career civil service prosecutors
headed by a presidential appointee-would reflect a compromise between inde-
pendence and accountability. The office would not be as independent as the
independent counsel, and its presence within the Justice Department would to
some extent give rise to an appearance of partiality. It would nevertheless en-
joy significant independence. The lawyers in the office would be Justice De-
partment "lifers," many of whom would have served under multiple admini-
strations. They would be largely immune from any threat of dismissal,
transfer, or reduction in salary. Their conduct would be largely shaped by pro-
fessional norms assimilated over the span of a career.
There are a variety of possibilities for giving the head of the office, whom
I assume would be a presidential appointee, greater independence than ordi-
nary political appointees. One possibility would be to protect the head against
removal except for good cause, as is currently done for the commissioners of
independent regulatory agencies. Another possibility would be to restrict the
President to appointing career prosecutors as heads. A third possibility would
be to permit removal, but require a public statement of reasons delivered to
Congress explaining why, as with inspectors general. For practical purposes,
the choice probably would not matter too much. In the midst of an investiga-
tion of a serious executive branch scandal, political realities would prevent the
President from removing the head except for true derelictions of duty.
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While giving up a measure of independence, the civil service option would
gain a significant measure of accountability. The head of the office would be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Given the high visi-
bility of the office and its importance to the constitutional scheme, consider-
able attention would be directed to the selection of an office head. Thus, it is
unlikely that the President could appoint a crony lacking in any credibility.
Limiting appointment to persons with a minimum number of years experiences
as a prosecutor (say five years) would provide some additional protection
against insertion of a political hack.
Such a civil service office would also enjoy. additional legitimacy if, as I
anticipate would be the case, it would eventually acquire a reputation for pro-
fessionalism and competence. Membership in the office would be a prestig-
ious appointment with the Department, highly sought after by prosecutors in
U.S. Attorneys offices and the Criminal Division. These career prosecutors
would no doubt have a high level of dedication, and would be respected and
trusted by judges, defense attorneys, and all other players with whom they
regularly interact.95 All this would translate into greater legitimacy in the eyes
of the press and the public, and would insulate the office from the kinds of
charges of partisan politics that have dogged independent counsels.
The civil service option would also capitalize on the more intangible ad-
vantages of being a perianent professional office rather than a transient insti-
tution. The civil service option would'create an office with a long term rather
than a short term perspective on high-level criminal investigations. The office
would operate under a budget, and would have to determine how to allocate its
limited resources among competing cases. This, plus the maturity and per-
spective that come from long service, should mean that the office would focus
its attentions onthe most meritorious cases with the most serious implications.
The number of investigations would probabiy fall, and'almost certainly the
number of indictments would go down. When investigations and prosecutions
did occur, they would be resolved more rapidly and at lower cost. The public-
ity surrounding investigations would diminish if not disappear, as the standard
norm of not commenting on pending proceedings until an indictment is an-
nounced would take over. All this -would be a welcome relief after the experi-
ence with independent counsels.
This is not to suggest that there are no risks associated with the civil serv-
ice option. One danger is that the office, nestled inside the Justice Department
and subject to review and oversight by the leadership of the Department on
most issues (except where the leadership was recused for traditional conflicts
of interest), would be too pusillanimous in pursuing executive wrongdoing.
One would hope that the professionalism and pride of the staff and the com-
95. See Merrill, supra note 35 (explaining how the use of civil service lawyers in the So-
licitor General's office has contributed to its considerable reputation with the Supreme Court).
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parative independenceof the head would work against this, but nonetheless it
clearly might happen. Of course, if worst came to worst, public pressure
would mount for appointment of an ad hoc independent prosecutor. In this
sense, the executive branch option would always be available to backstop the
civil service option.
Another and opposite danger would be that the office would become an
autonomous empire, holding the rest of the executive branch hostage to threats
of criminal prosecution for minor derelictions. Again, traditions of profession-
alism among career prosecutors should work against such a scenario. As an
additional form of protection against such an eventuality it probably would be
a good idea to establish an outer limit on the term of service for the head of
this office, perhaps four years to coincide with a presidential term of office.9 6
V. CONCLUSION
Congress should take the opportunity presented by the present disquiet
over the Independent Counsel Act and its scheduled expiration in June to fun-
damentally rethink the premises of independent investigations of executive
branch officers. Independent counsels have proven to be a uniquely bad idea
and should be done away with. Would an office of civil service prosecutors be
a panacea? Clearly not. Would it be better than the current arrangement or
other options? I think on balance it would be.
Amending the Act to give independent investigations to an office of civil
service prosecutors would probably not return American politics to
"normalcy," defined as the condition that prevailed before Watergate. Con-
stant investigations of executive officers has become too much an element of
our political culture to be weeded out overnight. But I think there is a chance
of moving to a situation that more closely, approximates sanity. That, it seems
to me, is high praise-given what we have endured in recent times.
96. It is primarily for these reasons that I would object to the creation of a permanent office
of independent counsel created along the lines of an independent agency. Such an office would
lack the constraints on its behavior that would come from being a functioning unit with the Jus-
tice Department. In addition, we should not suppose that corruption is so endemic in the execu-
tive branch that a full-time independent office will always be needed to investigate high-level
government officials. An office located within the Justice Department could be used to investi-
gate federal judges, members of Congress, and state and local officials as well as executive offi-
cials, and if the happy day should come when politicians at all levels are clean, it could be de-
tailed to work on other types of white collar criminal investigations. An independent agency
devoted solely to investigating executive officials would have to justify its existence, which could
translate into too much investigating of trivial allegations.
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